Recruitment begins at the border as Estonia catches record number of Russian agents

Estonia’s internal security service has detained at least eight individuals working for Russian intelligence over the past year — the highest number on record — underscoring an increasingly aggressive recruitment campaign along the country’s eastern border.

According to the annual report of the Estonian Internal Security Service, published Monday, many of those recruited had routine reasons to cross into Russia. Several were dual citizens of Estonia and Russia, traveling for work or family.

The cases span a range of outcomes: eight agents were convicted, four individuals were expelled from Estonia, one suspect was extradited to Ukraine, and another was convicted for engaging in pro-Kremlin propaganda activities.

The report highlights the central role of Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB, which oversees both intelligence operations and border control. Recruitment efforts are said to be concentrated at key crossing points such as Narva and Koidula — with Narva now a primary transit route into Russia following Finland’s closure of its eastern border.

FSB operatives, often posing as border guards, are stationed at these crossings. According to the report, they may wear official uniforms only as cover. Their primary task is to identify and recruit potential intelligence sources among travelers.

Initial interactions can appear routine. Border crossers are asked standard questions about travel plans, relatives in Russia, and accommodation details. In some cases, they are also questioned about their views on Russia’s war in Ukraine — referred to by Russian authorities as a “special operation.” Follow-up contact may come later from the same officers.

One such case involved a 63-year-old dual Estonian-Russian citizen who lived in the Russian city of Petseri while working at a spa in Estonia near the border. She was among those drawn into cooperation.

The report also identifies four Russian nationals with Estonian residence permits who were expelled on security grounds, with their permits revoked. Three were linked directly to Russian intelligence services. The fourth was found to have spread pro-Russian historical narratives and engaged in hostile actions against Estonian border guards.

In a separate case, a Ukrainian citizen was detained for supplying anonymous SIM cards from Estonian mobile operators to the FSB. He was later extradited to Ukraine. Investigators found he had received no payment, instead acting out of concern for property and family members in Russian-occupied territories.

The report names FSB liaison officer Maksim Mishustin as a key figure behind several operations, including activities in Ukraine. He has been associated with an agent network allegedly involved in planning an assassination attempt against Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the spring of 2024.

Estonian authorities say the cases reflect a broader pattern: recruitment efforts that begin with routine border encounters but can evolve into sustained intelligence cooperation under pressure, coercion, or personal vulnerability.